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Research Areas
We invite researchers to become Area Editors. Each research area (RA) is highly focused. Together, they provide a rich knowledge base for agent-based IS.
SIG Focus
Our site is strictly focused on agent-based information systems. It is important, however, to explain how do we define this and the scope of our special interest group.
First, what is an information system (IS)? In line with the research literature, we define an IS as a group of information technology (IT) components serving a common purpose, which is to automate a particular set of business activities (for example, Bakos 1985; and for a survey of the types of IT components, see Dewett and Jones 2001, 317-320).
Second, what is an "agent" and how is the term used in the IS literature?
We follow Holland, an artificial intelligence scholar and genetic algorithms pioneer, in our conceptualization of an agent in IS. In his research on complex adaptive systems--nonlinear systems defined by the interactions of large numbers of adaptive agents--Holland borrowed the term "agents" from economics "to refer to active elements without invoking specific contexts" (1995, 6-7). The field of economics that Holland was referring to is Agency Theory, which explains how to best organize the relationship between one party--the principal--who determines the work, and another party--the agent--who undertakes the work (Ross 1973; Grossman and Hart 1983; and for a survey, see Sappington 1991). Agency theory analyzes the costs of resolving two types of conflicts that can arise between principals and agents under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the condition under which the principal cannot ascertain if the agent accurately represents his ability to do the work for which he is being paid. Moral hazard is the condition under which the principal cannot be sure if the agent has put forth maximal effort (Eisenhardt, 1989).
References Bakos, J. Y. 1985. Toward a More Precise Concept of Information Technology. Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems, Indianapolis, Indiana: 17-24. Dewett, T., and G. R. Jones. 2001. The Role of Information Technology in the Organization: A Review, Model, and Assessment. Journal of Management 27: 313-346. Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy Of Management. The Academy Of Management Review 14(1): 57-75. Grossman, S., and O. Hart. 1983. An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica 51: 7-45. Holland, J. H. 1995. Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Helix, Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA. Ross. S. 1973. The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. American Economic Review 63: 134-139. Sappington, D. 1991. Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 45-66.
(Created by: csl, 02/14/02; last modified by: csl, 10/14/03.)
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